Following up on a proposal presented to the community by Bill Schlesinger
(JRN) last year, NOAA Corps Officer Don Dreves was invited to present
information on the Global Fiducial Program (GFP), an initiative begun by
then-Senator Al Gore's recommendation that classified technologies be used
in research. Some of these technologies have been used in research for 20
years, for example, in geological mapping. Demonstration projects, such as
the Civil Requirement Group (NASA, EPA, DOE, NSF, CIA), have already been
completed. The intelligence community wants civil agencies like NSF to buy
into the program, and within NSF LTER is a particularly good fit.

The objectives of the GFP are: 1) to use national classified assets to
obtain a long-term record at sites worldwide to study environmental
processes and changes that occur over years or decades (natural
environmental variation, human-caused changes); and 2) to benefit the next
generation of scientists (the long-term record available will be
declassified at some point). Once met, GFP objectives will: 1) make data
available in an active archive (data will be classified, oldest likely to
be declassified in future), 2) allow analysis of data to document
environmental change and understand long-term processes (classified data
available to properly cleared scientists, can prepare unclassified derived
products).

Dreves distributed a MEDEA-recommended site selection list of 132 sites
(including most LTERs), and provided Jim Gosz with a program summary. The
GFP program involves: 1) calibrating sites (have ongoing investigations
and other imagery, use to help understand NTM assets); 2) establishing
change detection and process study sites (sites or transects most useful
to study long-term change, coordinate with on-the-ground activities or
unclassified imagery record, if possible); and 3) identifying criteria for
selection (agency mission and mandates, long-term environmental change).
Participating agencies will have the opportunity to get images for sites
that normally would not be accessible, either due to cost or their
classified nature. It is possible to define a central point and
boundaries, with accuracy to a 10th of a minute. The intelligence
community expects to produce 6,000 to 12,000 images per year--about 12
images/site on average. Currently declassified data include Corona
satellite data, ER-2 and Blackhawk datasets from around 1969-1972.

The data and information management intelligence community is funding this
effort out of an environmental program created a few years ago. They have
agreed to provide: 1) data (digital form, one central location); 2) data
access (via a database management system with a user-friendly interface
that will enable browsing (B & W panchromatic) imagery, remote access to
directory over a secure line); and 3) archives (will make data available
for fiducial sites, pointers to data location--Reston, Virginia--in
database management system, and pointers to unclassified data sources).
There will be a web-type page with a link to the relevant person with
classified clearance.

A policy for analysis access is presently being created by the central
imagery office. The policy likely will include: 1) a PI and government
project leader will be identified for each site, and 2) ongoing analysis
and evaluation (to assure data quality, that collections accomplish the
program purpose, and that data are useful). In discussion it was noted
that spectral imagery now cannot be used in a derived publication, and
that journals will have to start making accommodation. Bob Wharton (MCM)
cited a recent example of using unclassified derived products for
publication (see Schlesinger, W.H. and N. Gramenopoulos. 1996. Archival
photographs show no climate-induced changes in woody vegetation in the
Sudan, 1943-94. Global Change Biol. 2, 101-105).

The primary intention of the program will be to create a digital archive.
The intelligence community has agreed to fund program development and
capital investment for the archive startup, and to provide digital data.
The plan is to develop a self-managed working group of civil agency
participants. If NSF, NOAA and USGS do not nominate sites and demonstrate
an interest in participating in a timely manner, the intelligence
community will likely withdraw the program. Dreves pointed out that there
are no direct costs to the civil agencies (other than personnel) for at
least five years (USGS budget includes support) but, down the line, there
may be maintenance costs at the agency level. There are some restrictions
of which to be aware: 1) the activity cannot interfere with national
security interests; 2) the resolution level provides a "soda straw,"
rather than a broad view; and 3) manual intervention, once coordinates and
boundaries are defined, is not possible. The smart system computer will
run more or less automatically, adjusting to cloud cover. However, in
response to a significant event, agencies can obtain near real-time data.

The LTER/CC discussed whether it was essential initially for each site and
NSF to have a person identified for this activity. It was decided that
sites should have input (in terms of defining boundary conditions, spatial
coverage, etc.) into the type of imagery obtained and that John Vande
Castle (NET) would be a key person to obtain clearance as an extension of
his normal role. The process costs about $3,000 per individual. The
LTER-NASA remote sensing group should be able to inform this effort and be
a centralized pool of talent for LTER, if appropriate clearances can be
obtained. The imagery could be used in concert with SPOT or LANDSAT, since
images of all areas at all sites would probably not be possible to obtain.

A hand vote showed unanimous interest among the sites in acquiring the
imagery. (Although coordinates were provided to Bill Schlesinger previously,
the Shortgrass Steppe, formerly Central Plans, site will need to provide
new information to reflect its recent expansion.) Scott Collins agreed to
notify NSF--ultimately Tom Baerwald in GEO--of the sites' support).
Following a suggestion that a possible link could be made to the ILTER
effort, Don Dreves urged site representatives *not to share this activity
widely* --particularly with international colleagues--due to present
sensitivities and possible national security concerns.